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For although he was too strongly independent in his thinking to
accept the Marxist or socialist dogmas of his associates, because they
did not seem to square with experience, and though he admired the
tough resistance of English character and legal institutions to tyranny,
Orwell never did tumble to the understanding of man and government
which had shaped each over the centuries. Failing to see the
constants in human nature as the key to the political problem, he
looked around the world both as he perceived it and his literary
fellows portrayed it, and concluded that power lust was the strongest
social force, and that as "men are infinitely malleable,"1 it would lead
power hungry men to shape their fellow creatures to suit their will.
This paper explores Orwell’s writings from the perspective of western
legal theory and social science understandings of the individual and
society to contrast Orwell’s conflicted positions with the educated
thought of his own times.
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GEORGE ORWELL: SOCIALIST OR LIBERAL: BIG BROTHER AND
THE ABUSE OF POWER

"Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a
dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes a
revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of
persecution is persecution. The object of power is power."2
O'Brien

The writings of George Orwell provide a surprisingly good basis for the
discussion of power and the abuse of power in contemporary political theory.
Although Orwell was not well enough informed to elucidate or add much to our
understanding of these concepts, he was a perceptive observer of the political
thought of his times. Due in part to his own philosophical naivete, he managed to
embrace personally the great contradictions that characterize the major competing
political ideas of our century. He insisted to the end that he was a socialist. But
from all perspectives he was a renegade. Though he had indeed absorbed the
Marxist account of society and class exploitation, his own fuzzy solutions were
usually stated minimally in the language of English liberalism. And it was clearly
a continuing instinctual attachment to liberal modes of thought that precipitated
his violent reaction to Soviet atrocities and the corruption of the socialist
movement generally. It may well have been his lack of understanding of the
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structure of Anglo-American equality and freedom that kept his socialist
allegiance alive.
Orwell did not claim to have made significant contributions to political
theory. He was a popular writer with a strong political point of view. Though a
contemporary of the great analytic philosophers in England, he rarely felt the need
to think theoretical issues through clearly. Rather, he had great confidence in his
own moral intuitions of justice and equality, which he played out in theoretically
unselfconscious novels. He was fascinated by discussions of theoretical concepts
such as power, but his use of them in novels was not designed so much to explore
and develop the concepts as to buttress his own perceptions of the world and
visions of the future.
Our discussion of abuse of power would be greatly facilitated if there were
substantial agreement among political theorists on the significance of the basic
concept. But within the last two decades some have given up using the concept of
power altogether,3 while others have declared it to be "the most important single
idea in political theory."4 While some theorists have found most power
relationships to be sufficiently voluntarist in character as to attract no moral
concern,5 others believe every exercise of power is exploitative and, therefore,
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morally offensive.6 There is no generally accepted view of the matter today.

The Structure of Anglo-American Freedom
In spite of the many silly assertions in the popular press to the effect that
Orwell's 1984 has proven prophetic, we know too much about the world to deny
that the individual freedom routinely enjoyed in the United States in particular and
the western world in general is by far the most extensive in the world, and possibly
in all of human history. Our pervasive inability to fully appreciate that fact is
probably a bad omen for the future. George Orwell was only one of thousands of
intellectuals who did not understand the structure of the freedom they enjoyed.
His writings frequently reveal an acute sensitivity to tyranny and its origins in
human nature. But the origins of freedom were an endless mystery.
By reasoning backward from the origins of American freedom, we may find
the theoretical account which Orwell and others needed. The eighteenth century
Americans were possibly the freest people in the world at the time. Preoccupied
by European troubles, the English government had let the affairs of the
unprofitable American colonies slide. Left to themselves, the governors appointed
by the Crown found themselves forced to accommodate the real political pressures
of the colonies and consequently allowed various kinds of legislative power to
grow at the expense of administrative power. By 1763 the colonial legislatures
quite generally enjoyed most of the classical privileges and rights of Parliament
against their respective governors, in fact if not by charter. As England woke up
and moved to reassert proper colonial administration in the 1760's, the Americans

6

ff.

William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, Lexington, D.C. Heath, 1974, pp. 97

5

were outraged and came to perceive themselves as slaves to a tyrannical power.
The Declaration of Independence quite deliberately justified the revolution
as an act in defense of the properly constituted law of England designed to correct
the illegal and unconstitutional acts of the king and Parliament. In spite of
widespread assumptions today that the Revolution was based in a rhetoric of
universal human rights in the French style, the historical facts will not support
this. Rather, the Americans self-consciously characterized their actions as efforts
to maintain the law of England, which had been corrupted in the mother country.
The American justification only makes sense if freedom is thought to be
grounded in law or "the commonwealth of laws." Although religious and
libertarian rhetoric abounded in those founding years, the official documents on
which the American republic was based, almost totally avoided both. The
Constitution mentions no universal rights as entitled to constitutional status--not
even as amended with the Bill of Rights. And the Declaration of Independence
only makes passing obeisance to that rhetoric before mounting a tough legal
indictment of the official English conduct. The laws were clearly seen as the
source of their actual freedom. And government conduct which endangered the
laws endangered the freedom of the people.
Using language made popular in the next century, we would say that the
Americans had inherited the English appreciation for rule of law. They saw
protection for the weak from the strong in laws that restricted all alike, that gave
no special legal status or privilege to any group, and that only acted in a
prospective way. If the government officers were fully subject to the requirements
of the law, tyranny would be difficult to create. And if law could only be enforced
in accordance with an elaborate set of procedures which had evolved over
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centuries to minimize arbitrary punishment, individuals could regulate themselves
in the pursuit of their private ends, to avoid legal offenses. This is the freedom for
which these people were willing to fight.
The Americans had also inherited the English constitutional genius, and
particularly appreciated Hume's political reasoning. They saw clearly that the
constitutional problem was not one of articulating some true political principles.
They attempted none. Rather, they set out an intentionally complicated system for
governing that would constantly require consent and agreement from many
different elements of society and of the government. The system was quite
self-consciously designed primarily to control the violence of faction, the source
from which the destruction of law and the elevation of tyranny historically has
come. The law-making function was separated from the law-enforcing one. The
responsibility for government was divided between the central government and the
states. The Senate and the House of Representatives checked each other and in
turn were jointly checked by the executive, the courts, and the people in periodic
elections.
The Constitution, in short, was a super-legal device designed to protect the
integrity of the law (in terms of rule of law as a standard).
From the perspective of the rhetoric of the French Revolution and later
socialist revolutions, it would seem that the Americans had very modest
objectives. A decade of experience with themselves and the Articles of
Confederation had disabused the American luminaries of any unwarranted
optimism about their own abilities to stand aloof from self-interest, that might
have been generated during their remarkable revolution. As they drew themselves
reluctantly back into the folds of Hume's conservative philosophy, Madison's
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lament that "men are not angels" became an American commonplace. That basic
assumption about the nature of man lies at the very root of constitutionalist
thought. For if men will not abuse authority, there is no need of a constitution.
The American approach to constitutionalism explicitly rests on the Humean view
that men are corruptible, that they tend to put their own interests first, even when it
may cause harm to others. This implies on the one hand a necessity for a common
authority that can discourage private exploitation. And it also implies the need for
limitations on the power of that civil authority itself.
This assumption about man shapes constitutionalist thought at several
levels. Whether articulated or not it is the insight that compels all human societies
to recognize that laws are essential for human interaction. Not only are men
generally incapable of coming to a full agreement on the basis of true moral
principles, they are even less capable of consistently adhering to such principles
even should they find them. And so, law becomes necessary to make life in
society tenable. Law becomes a substitute for that moral ideal which the human
imagination continually generates anew. Given the nature of men, law is the
highest form of social organization to which we can in fact achieve. Law is a
compromise which protects individuals and groups in the pursuit of their own
moral visions, but which declines to nationalize that pursuit. And that is why
socialists do not get along well with the traditional notion of law.
At a second level, law requires enforcement and enforcement agencies.
These governments with coercive power create a second level on which human
self-interest and even power lust can act out their course. Assuming the value of
law, constitutionalist thinkers have recognized the necessity of institutional
constraints on public authorities, both to protect the people from abuses of public
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power and to protect the laws from degeneration or sabotage.
For a society to maintain itself over time it must have a standing agreement
on the procedures and officials by which disputes will be decided under the law.
The community must also have an agreement on the means by which these
officials will be selected at any point in time. These are constitutional choices.
But the science of constitutionalism focuses most directly on a third choice which
is the particular balancing and arrangement of governmental institutions to prevent
them from being diverted from their assigned functions of administering and
enforcing law to the alternative function of advancing the fortunes of the officials
themselves. Madison called these "auxiliary precautions."
The western tradition with its ongoing quest for rule of law, has ordinarily
defined authority in terms of both power and legitimacy. Legitimacy indicates that
the power is both constituted and exercised according to previously agreed upon
rules, and the agreement is assumed in some strong sense not to have been forced,
but to have been based on a widely shared expectation that we would be better off
- individually and collectively - for submitting ourselves in this way to a human
authority.
Because this kind of authority must be rule constituted, it cannot act in its
own name, but only in the name of its rule constituted office. It does not speak for
its own will. Acts of authority are not then properly reduced in general to acts of
power. This is not to deny that people with authority can act to promote their own
will. But if we characterize their actions generally in this way we will have given
up the basic ideas of rule of law that underly western liberty.
It would be a mistake to consider authority as a mere subset of power.
Rather, it is a separate concept defined partially in terms of power. Authority
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entails some grant of (coercive) power from the group over which it is exercised.
It is a rule governed exercise of the power of the group. Authority is also a human
fabrication designed to alleviate or prevent the intolerable effects of the exercise
of unrestrained power, either in anarchy and chaos (Hobbes' state of nature) or in a
totalitarian regime (Orwell). When the concept of authority is reduced to nothing
more than a form of power we have the very essence of tyranny.
People who hold positions of authority are formally expected to act for the
common good. Because we understand the temptations that can present
themselves to such people we provide institutional constraints to reduce to an
absolute minimum the discretionary choices that authorities can make that will
promote their own personal interests or those of some faction. All too often we
find that our institutions are inadequate in this respect or that they work against
this purpose. And we therefore observe all too frequently the corruption of
authority. In such cases we might reasonably talk about abuses of power if
someone is able to advance personal interests through a position of authority.
George Orwell illustrates the general intellectual confusion in these matters
quite well. For although he was too strongly independent in his thinking to accept
Marxist or socialist dogmas that did not seem to square with experience, and
though he admired the tough resistance of English character and legal institutions
to tyranny, he never did tumble to the understanding of man and government
which had shaped each over the centuries. Failing to see the constants in human
nature as the key to the political problem, he looked around the world both as he
perceived it and his literary fellows portrayed it, and concluded that power-lust
was the strongest social force, and that as "men are infinitely malleable,"7 it would
7
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lead power hungry men to shape their fellow creatures to suit their will. Hence,
1984.
The moral assumptions underlying the eighteenth century commitment to
rule of law are also important to recognize. However we might want to articulate
these assumptions, they come back to one point, that it is wrong for one person to
use the life of another to promote his own interests without the other's voluntary
agreement. Exploitation is wrong; each individual is a moral agent. But rule of
law is not a device to enforce this view or to draw it deductively into legal rules.
Rather it offers practical protection to the principle. And only this principle
enables us to make full sense of the rule of law. The principle implicitly prohibits
the coercive pursuit of its realization in the life of every man. Rather, it requires
maximum liberty for each individual to pursue his or her own utopia to the extent
this can be done without exploiting others in the process.
With this understanding of our institutions of freedom, we can now examine
twentieth century theories of power, including Orwell's, in two important contexts
that will each help us understand better how our theories have gone wrong. The
first, and more obvious context I will examine, is the history of jurisprudence as it
relates to this question. The second will be the philosophy of explanation in the
social science and what it says to us about the nature of men and societies, and the
ways that we can talk about them.

The Idea of Law
Almost all the major developments in jurisprudence in the last century and a
half have been inimical to rule of law. Legal positivism has been the dominant
movement, and its central thesis is that law reduces to will, the will of the
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sovereign. Sovereignty or authority in turn is defined in terms of power. Because
there is no intrinsic content to the law, there can be no rules of legitimation. Early
positivists paid considerable attention to the formal structure of law, but because
they accept will as the source of law, they cannot solve the legitimacy issue.
Positivist theory makes the mistake of distinguishing the provinces of
jurisprudence and politics too severely, leaving the law no choice but to accept
any content that the political powers might provide. The Nuremburg trials
provided a particularly painful example of this weakness of the positivist theory.
The essential point of rule of law is to insulate law from arbitrary will. This
traditional outlook certainly recognizes the universal tendency of legal systems to
be corrupted by will. But it provides endless remedies and safeguards against this
insidious process. And it would never accept the legitimacy of such corruption.
Rather it would see the positivist concept of law as a wholesale attack on the idea
of the law as a protective umbrella under which everyone, including especially the
weak, could pursue their interests without fear of arbitrary interference from the
strong. If this is to be the effect of law, it cannot just be the command of the
sovereign, or of any other human, including the judge.
It is of considerable interest to see how mid-twentieth century positivists
came to share some of these same reservations. Hart very effectively rejected the
simple positivist view of law as "the gunman writ large." But his own searching
for a better criterion of legitimacy comes up short. And we have nothing better
than the practices of a people to guide us.
The Marxists also see law as a function of power and will, but in a much
different way. Marx' early studies were in historical jurisprudence. He became an
historicist, and denied that law consisted of rules or norms, arguing rather that it is
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the general development of history. And power is all there is. Jurisprudence is
just the history of power. Law serves as an instrument of the ruling class in the
struggle for power. Because only the rule of the proletariat is legitimate, all law as
we know it today is suspect and is instrumental in the oppression of the masses.
Marxists could never see that formal rules could function to restore legitimacy and
constrain power.
It is ironic that the native homeland of modern rule of law should also
spawn the great theories of anti-law. Perhaps the nineteenth century marks the
corruption of England's self understanding of its great legal tradition. Certainly,
by the mid-twentieth century few there or elsewhere could explain these traditions
without wrongly invoking socialist notions of democracy, social classes, and the
public good. And corresponding to the rather ordinary confusion of law with will,
we can see the conflation the concepts of authority and power.
Characteristically, it is thinkers on the left who are most interested in power
as an issue in political theory. Rather than analyzing the agreement that underlies
authority relationships and recognizing the human gains they can represent for
both order and freedom, these thinkers tend to start with generalizations about
such relationships and a presumption that they are essentially evil. Of course, this
is a very dangerous approach for a socialist to take, particularly if he is honest. In
fact, Orwell's greatest mistake as a socialist was to think too much about power.
For he discovered that its socialist manifestations were unavoidably malignant and
resistant to the tempering institutions of constitutional government. For as
Kolakowski has also concluded, ". . . modern totalitarianism is inseparably linked
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with the history of socialist ideas and movements."8
Contemporary radicals see the exercise of power as iniquitous in every
instance because of a definition that recognizes neither the voluntariness of
exchange nor the legitimacy of coercion based on rules. The enlightened Marxist
claims to see what is invisible to everyone else, a hidden social structure which,
once understood, reveals that our voluntary exchanges and rule based authority are
really forms of illegitimate coercion, and that we are self-deceived if we fail to see
the wickedness inherent in all such exercises of power.

An American radical, William E. Connolly, provides a convenient example
of this approach.9 The radical view separates out simple rational persuasion as the
only morally permissible exercise of influence because it is not an exercise of
power. All the other kinds of influence, i.e., exercises of power of A over B are at
some "moral distance" from persuasion and are therefore "presumptively wrong
acts."10 These exercises of power could include threats, manipulation,
impediments, behavioral conditioning, coercion, or even cases of self-deception.
It is quite possible for the recipient of the power exercise not to recognize it as
8
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such because he has deceived himself about his own interests and desires. And it
is just as possible that the power exerciser may deceive himself that he is not
exercising power and that he does not even care to influence the other person's
behavior.11 In this latter case we can see that the repressive use of power will be
quite invisible to both the oppressor and the oppressed. No doubt there will be
enlightened liberators at hand who can point out these evils which we cannot see
and help us to overturn the society which fosters them.
In addition to power as "ability to", Connolly wishes to define it as an
exercise which impairs another's choice for which someone can be held
responsible. With the definition thus enriched, he is prepared to talk about
collectivities exercising power, limiting the choice of other collectivities, and thus
generating some collective responsibilities. Thus "to attribute power to another
(whether an individual or group). . . is more like accusing him of something,
which is then to be denied or justified."12 And consequently power elites will
always prefer to exercise power through more subtle means than force and
coercion.
The combination of this notion of collective responsibility and the
elimination of intentions from the definition of an exercise of power, exposes the
radical analysis to some counter-intuitive criticisms from the standpoint of
non-Marxist economic theory. Intentions, are of course quite troublesome for the
radical analysis which sees oppressive power exercise in all kinds of individual
actions and social structures which no one could be construed to have intended to
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be repressive. But once unintentional effects of actions are allowed into the
analysis, two very surprising conclusions emerge.
1.

The upper and middle classes by their enterprise have benefitted the
underclasses more than they have benefitted themselves. By far the
greatest economic benefits of capitalism have gone to the many, to
workers, and even the unemployed or poor. No one is likely to argue
that this result was produced by the intentions of those classes.

2.

And furthermore, many of the most damaging policies and actions for
the welfare of the poor are results of their own private and public
choices. Are the poor then their own greatest oppressors? Should
they rise in revolt and throw themselves out of this elite power
position that so threatens their own welfare? If I agreed with
Connolly's radical analysis, I would have to say "yes." (And the same
analysis would hold for the middle and upper classes.) But of course
the poor never understand these matters anyway. They need the
guidance and protection of an elite intelligentsia to show them these
things. And of course that is just what the socialist nations have
done; i.e., they have taken away from the poor and the workers the
ability to harm (or benefit) themselves through intelligent individual
action.

The standard leftist solution to instances of power abuse is to give more
power to the abused, and, in the Marxist version, all power to the proletariat. This
approach fails to recognize the corruptibility of human nature, the recognition of
which has always led constitutional thinkers to seek a solution in the institutional
limitation of power. And history continues to confirm their view that when
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repressed classes gain power they are at least as likely to abuse it as were their
predecessors, if they do not subject themselves to adequate constitutional
restraints.

The constitutional view that human nature is corruptible falls far short

of the view of Hans Morgenthau and others, including even Orwell himself, that
an inborn lust for power is common to many or all men. Rather it is simply the
observation that the universal tendency of men to seek their own self-interest, even
at some cost to others, takes on more malevolent proportions as their power in the
world increases and as increased opportunities to exploit others present
themselves. For constitutionalists, laws and constitutions punishing such
exploitation and limiting the opportunities for such comprise the safest strategy.
For leftists or utopians who do not fear unrestrained power in the hands of the
proletariat or enlightened elites, the solution is simply to transfer or centralize
power, even if necessary through violent revolution.
In the twentieth century it was totalitarian governments that made the
acquisition and aggrandizement of power their foremost end. And the collapse of
democratic European regimes before the totalitarian threat appeared to some
theorists to be linked to their neglect of power. Democrats like Charles Merriam,
George Catlin, Harold Lasswell, Hans Morgenthau and Bertrand Russell all began
to emphasize power in their theories. Many twentieth century theorists have
followed their lead by treating power or control as the basic unit of political and
social analysis. While Morgenthau applied his insights primarily to international
relations, the other four concentrated on the dominant role which the lust for
power and the actual possession of power play in domestic politics. Just two years
before Orwell wrote 1984, Morgenthau concluded that power politics is "rooted in
this lust for power which is common to all men," and which, therefore, is
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"inseparable from social life itself."13 Like Morgenthau, Orwell was concerned
about the collapse of the democracies in the face of totalitarian aggression. But
whereas Morgenthau, Catlin, and others hoped to provide the democracies with
the spine to use power deliberately in international politics and with the wisdom to
entrust their own political power to "the right type of person," Orwell was
exploring the thesis that the universal lust for power would lift the worst type of
person to the top, even in the democracies. With the aid of future technology,
Orwell feared this power lust could eventually produce stable, worldwide
totalitarianism.
The sociologist, Dennis H. Wrong, has produced the most thorough recent
work on power.14 But he also misses the essential point about authority. His first
error is to see authority as the subdivision of power which includes all instances
where one person obeys the commands or directions of another. This includes
everything from a bank teller handing over the cash to a gunman to a patient
taking the medicine prescribed by a physician. Within this range of cases he does
identify those which are "legitimate authority." But even here, he focuses on the
sociological rather than the essential political character of the authority
relationship when he indicates that such authority is essentially constituted by
shared norms.15 He misses the point that authority rests more on an agreement in
the face of an unavoidable need for certain kinds of authoritative decisions where
shared norms are inadequate to produce spontaneous agreement. As Lucas points
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out, this does include some shared norms, i.e., that submission to some specified
community decision process is preferable to anarchy or some inferior process.16
And as Michael Oakeshott has written, ". . . civil association is an intelligent
engagement and not a so-called 'pattern of behavior'. . . ."17 Oakeshott would not
want to push back to some actual primitive agreement, nor to a mythical contract.
He is merely referring to the actual moral rules to which we appeal in making
decisions in a society.
Theorists have defined power both broadly and narrowly. The broad
definitions of the exchange theorists include every exercise of influence, including
those instances in which people voluntarily modify their behavior in exchange for
attractive inducements. The more narrow definitions identify power with the
ability to initiate coercion, choosing to leave aside voluntary exchanges in which
each party improves its position. On this view, the problem of abuse of power is
the problem of controlling armies, governments and gangsters. And rule of law is
the solution. On this view there can be legitimate uses of power in accordance
with the rules under which the government is authorized to act. But any other
exercise of power outside those rules is a form of tyranny or anarchy that rule of
law is designed to avoid.
Few contemporary writers fully appreciate Madison's insight that the
essence of constitutionalism is this concern with "auxiliary precautions" or the
"contrivances which not only describe but confine government, at least in its
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everyday activities."18 Hayek expressed a similar insight when he defined
constitutional law as "a superstructure erected to secure the maintenance of the
law, rather than the source of all other law."19 And certainly, Orwell and the left in
his generation never did see this as the key to the structure of Anglo-American
freedom. Norman Podhoretz recently created a furor by claiming Orwell as a
nascent neoconservative.20 But this persistent blindness to the nature of man, the
law and constitutions would certainly have made him look even more out of place
in that camp than he already appeared among socialists.

The Moralistic Error
On the other extreme from those who see law as will are the contemporary
legal philosophers who propose to derive law and constitutional principles from
abstract dissertations on rights. But this is not the best answer to positivism and
socialism. In fact, in some cases it may even provide a new tack for the old
socialist objectives, using the judiciary to usher in the moral egalitarian state
instead of revolution. On this view a good constitution would provide a statement
of such true principles or human rights as a basis against which legislation could
be evaluated. Unfortunately, twentieth century political thought has concentrated
much more on this approach, ignoring the crying need for new and stronger
institutional checks thrust on us by the growth of power in central governments.
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Theories of rights can only function as political or social facts and do not
play any higher role in legal or political theory--under rule of law. For if law is
based on consensus or agreement, it cannot be derived from a theory of rights
unless all parties needed for the consensus perform the same derivation.
The true function of theories of rights is to provide models of justification
or criticism to be held up against one or another political or legal system, real or
imagined, to measure moral standing. The measure only carries weight with those
who share the particular theory used. But within such circles the measurement
can be a strong influence on practical decisions about support for the actual laws.
In a system of law the theories of rights can never be invoked by judges
without converting themselves ipso facto into a super legislature. The distinction I
want to draw between a legislature and a court rests on my theory of separation of
powers, which in turn rests on the theory of rule of law. If one does not accept
these, as Dworkin for example obviously does not, the argument does not engage.
This problem has been thrust on the world because of our modern discovery,
i.e., that laws are made by men. Before that notion took root, the judge was not so
obviously in a position of judging the law itself. However, it is likely that in the
process of construing law, judges in ancient and medieval times did perform some
analogous function.
But now that we recognize men as the source of law, the question arises as
to the criteria that the judge will use. And it would seem self-evident that if the
judge is not sovereign, he cannot act in a way that renders him an author of law.
He can only construe or apply. Dworkin's attempt to make him into a legislator
responsible to a true theory of rights simply ignores the problem of human nature.
For if men are in fact capable of regularly and reliably drawing correct logical
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inferences from a true and comprehensive theory of rights without being affected
either by interests or idiosyncratic perspective, then giving judges such a
responsibility would not destabilize the legal system. But stability of legal
expectations is one of the essential products of a good legal system. And if one's
judgment of men precludes in any way the above described possibility, a different
approach to judging needs to be found. And one key to that approach has been the
development of legislatures as bodies which are not expected to deduce laws from
a single true theory of rights, but to forge legal rules which are mutually
acceptable given the range of theories of rights held by the citizenry. Because of
this very fact that there are a range of theories being served by the laws as
negotiated through legislatures, it is a prima facie error to instruct a judge to
construe a law in terms of a single true theory of rights which he must divine
behind the political and legal system he serves. To so instruct a judge is to reject
the basic political constitution which recognizes fundamental lack of agreement on
theories of rights and implements the desire of individual citizens as a body to
establish a political and legal community which can serve them well in the absence
of such an authoritative true theory.
Should Dworkin ever choose to respond to such a criticism, he might try to
argue that in spite of our perceived disagreements, there must at some level of
abstraction actually be agreement on a true theory which minimally sets out the
rights we do all expect. The error of this is that he moves in the wrong direction to
find the agreement. And it is not really the case that he can admit that the strength
of his theory of rights rests on agreement anyway. He wants it to be simply true.
The correct direction to move is to a discussion of principles of rule of law which
do not provide a thick theory of rights, but which do set up norms by which judges
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and others can criticize and elaborate legislation in a regime built on the
recognition of disagreement about some fundamental matters.
One's views about human nature should then determine how one proceeds in
this matter. For if one accepts a conservative or Humean view of man, the theory
of rights cannot have legal status that is binding on judges. And conversely, if one
believes that a theory of rights is binding on judges, he implicitly endorses a much
more positive view of man. The disturbing thing about moralistic theorists such as
Dworkin is that they do not see this connection. They ignore the most crucial
practical judgment that must be made in a political system. For much of their
actual language uses the assumptions of legal realism and economics that men are
self-interested actors, even in their official roles as judges and legislators. Yet the
assumption that the implementation of their moralistic theories of law would
produce superior results in terms of the values of their theory either overlooks the
practical implications of human self-serving behavior, or it assumes it away with
an implicit theory that men are naturally moral and cooperative. Neither will do.
And that realization is what has given priority to constitutionalist thinking in the
Anglo-American tradition.
The other side of this matter is that when moralistic theorists (liberals) see
interests and factions making their impact at every level of the political and legal
process, they can easily be disillusioned and conclude with the positivists that only
power relationships matter. In this sense they are actually more pessimistic than
the conservative who accepted the reality of this process as a given and moved less
ambitiously to constitutionalism and rule of law as a means of mitigating or even
removing the worst effects of a system that gives reign to free pursuit of interests.
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Methodological Individualism and Holism
Another way of analyzing Orwell's troubles with his fellow socialists and
his frequent sympathies with conservative outlooks would be to compare
methodologies of social explanation. Socialists have almost always relied on
holistic analysis in sociology and economics. Class and social forces explain
group behavior. But conservatives and classical liberals have usually followed the
opposite approach, which explains group phenomena entirely in terms of
individual choices. There may indeed be universal tendencies in those choices,
but they really are made by individuals. Though most of the technical literature on
this topic ignores the political implications, the ideological issue has never been
far below the surface.21
I was consequently quite perplexed when I first noticed that Orwell often
aligned himself with the individualists in his intellectual methodology. For in his
novelistic treatment of leading characters, he relies exclusively on an individualist
analysis to explain behavior. But in his social analysis as well as his treatment of
secondary characters in his novels, he blames social and economic structure for
the evils he sees in society. Furthermore, even his main characters have very
defective relationships with other people, reflecting directly the same analytical
lapses as the author. They perceive others very insensitively and egocentrically,
never understanding others in the kind of terms in which they so desperately want
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to be understood themselves.
Orwell, however, persists in invoking moralistic stereotypes in his
explanations--thus robbing himself of the insights that could be gained from the
individualist methodology. His stereotype of the businessman prevents
appreciation of the amazing efficiency of a market. By stereotyping the parents of
poor private school children as seekers after the appearances of education only, he
concludes that benevolent government regulation is necessary for quality public
education.22
Orwell, like the Marxists and other structuralists, sees a power structure in
societies that defeats the efforts of both participants and victims to ameliorate its
effects. In Burmese Days23 the hero both sees the problem and can do nothing
about it, even in his personal life, except to commit suicide. British imperialism is
an evil and counterproductive system, but has a power of its own that resists
intelligent reform. Capitalism is likewise guilty of systems effects. Both give to a
few great power over many, and in Orwell's rather simple minded analysis,
permanently frustrate justice and equality.
Methodological holism has characterized the work of historicists,
organicists and structuralists in the social sciences. Emile Durkheim gave the
approach its classic formulation by insisting that sociology deals only with "social
facts" and not at all with individuals.24 Durkheim begins his exposition by noting
22
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types of conduct or thought which "are not only external to the individual but are,
moreover, endowed with coercive power, by virtue of which they impose
themselves upon him, independent of his individual will."25 Examples of such
"ways of acting, thinking, and feeling" which exist "outside the individual
consciousness" would include: the beliefs and practices of religious life, which
one finds ready-made at birth, language, the monetary system, the commercial
system, professional practices, etc.

Durkheim makes the mistake of concluding from the fact that these things
are real and influential independent of and prior to any particular individual
consciousness, that they are independent of every individual. This of course
cannot be right as these realities would disappear if every person who was aware
of them disappeared. They are maintained in human minds and depend on
acceptance there for their continuation. People change languages. Languages
disappear. People lose faith in monetary or credit systems. These systems
collapse and are replaced by others. People lose their faith or change their belief
systems in ways that reflect an accumulation of individual actions, and not some
external, independent causal reality.

But he is determined to maintain that social facts are essentially "external to
the individual" and that they are "endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of
which they control him." He is also anxious to insist that these external "ways of
acting, thinking, and feeling" are not biological. Nor are they "psychological
phenomena, which exist only in the individual consciousness and through it . . . .
25
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Since their source is not the individual, their substratum can be no other than
society . . . ."26

Durkheim explicitly recognizes that his view will shock "the zealous
partisams of absolute individualism".27 But our sense of being autonomous
individuals is an illusion. He defends this view by referring to the rearing of
children, the socialization of the human being, and the process of education.28
Through "unremitting pressure" the child is fashioned in the image of the social
milieu, and parents and teachers are its representatives and intermediaries.
Social facts are not the particular versions of social ways of thinking that are
reincarnated in the individual. Rather they are "the collective aspects of the
beliefs, tendencies, and practices of a group that characterize truly social
phenomena." Through repetition, these social manners "acquire a body, a tangible
form, and constitute a reality in their own right, quite distinct from the individual
facts which produce it."29
It is not clear how Durkheim makes the jump from this characterization of
social facts to the view that they are measurable and describable through
statistics. Averages such as rates of births, marriages, and suicides, express "a
certain state of the group mind (l''a^me collective)."30 "A social fact is every way of
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acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint;
or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at
the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual
manifestations." 31
The radical realism of this approach is reflected in Durkheim's insistence
that "the first and most fundamental rule is: Consider social facts as things."32 But
their roots in minds cannot be ignored.
"Indeed, social things are actualized only through men; they are a product of
human activity. They appear to be nothing but the overt manifestation of
ideas perhaps innate, contained in the mind; they are nothing but the
application of these ideas to the diverse circumstances involving the
relations of men. The organization of the family, of contracts, of
punishment, of the state, and of society appears thus to be simply the
embodiment of the ideas we hold concerning society, the state, justice,
etc."33
Durkheim is also very anxious to reject the practices of sociologists who
want to explain social phenomena or tendencies in terms of human nature or
psychological generalizations, citing Comte and Spencer specifically.34
". . . society is not a mere sum of individuals."
"When the individual has been eliminated, society alone remains. We must,
then, seek the explanation of social life in the nature of society itself . . . . A
whole is not identical with the sum of its parts. It is something different,
and its properties differ from those of its component parts."
31
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"every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a
psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is false."35
These views led Durkheim to state as a basic principle the following: "The
determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts
preceding it and not among the states of the individual consciousness."36
Perhaps the most influential response to the holistic view was a paper read
by Karl Popper in 1936 in which he argued that "...the task of social theory is to
construct and to analyse our sociological models carefully in descriptive or
nominalist terms, that is to say, in terms of individuals, of their attitudes,
expectations, relations, etc.--a postulate which may be called 'methodological
individualism'."37 The debate over this issue has not died. Joseph Agassi38 and
others have developed the individualist view and defended it quite successfully.
In turn John Wisdom and others have tried to argue more recently that one need
not take the extreme view of a Marx or a Durkheim in order to recognize that there
are social facts which interact with individual choices and therefore play some role
in the explanation of social phenomena.39
Recent developments in political theory vindicate the insight that this
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methodological dispute has significant bearing on the way one conceptualizes
power and the abuse of power. In 1974 Brian Barry convened a conference of
European political theorists to explore the concept of power in the furtherance of
political theory generally.40 Their primary objective seemed to be to refute the
catallactic theories which derive social and political power from voluntary
individual exchanges on a market model. However, their inspiration does not
seem to be a radical one. Rather they are welfare state liberals operating at the
theoretical level trying to salvage a position abandoned by empirical American
theorists of the same ideological persuasion. They are impressed with the
malignancy of power structures, thanks to Marxist analyses, and insist on using
these to bludgeon Hayek, Blau, and other theorists of voluntarism and
individualism. The collection demonstrates the centrality and persistence of the
power question --particularly for those who want to increase the centralized power
of the state to solve social problems.

Jack Lively attacked Peter Blau's exchange theory of social power41 in
particular and the catallactic approach in general, i.e., "the notion of a spontaneous
and self-adjusting order which emerges from the mutual exchange of benefits
between self-interested individuals."42 Pierre Birnbaum argues that Blau gets his
ideas from the sociologist George Homan's works on elementary individual
40
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behavior, and that both are linked to the utilitarianism of Bentham. Like Bentham
they maintain that it is "impossible to take account of the situation prior to
exchange based on utilitarian calculation, from either an empirical or a moral point
of view." Furthermore, "the principle of utility rests on an individualistic and
nominalistic concept of society. . . ," and does not recognize Durkheim's social
facts.43

Birnbaum finds Weber and Simmel guilty of nominalism as well, as
intermediate sources for Blau's and Homans' individualistic sociology. He quotes
Weber: "If I have become a sociologist. . . it is mainly in order to exorcize the
spectre of collective conceptions which still lingers among us. In other words,
sociology itself can only proceed from the actions of one or more separate
individuals and must therefore adopt strictly individualistic methods."44 This
methodological individualism that is hostile to the Marxist analysis of power is
often the sociology of Orwell. He seems to bridge the two points of view--but
unsuccessfully.
But how are social scientists to accomplish this project laid out for them by
the methodological individualists? Surprisingly, it would appear that modern
economic theory may offer one of the best models. Gary Becker has probably
done more than any other economist to develop the economic approach to the
explanation of social phenomena generally. Becker is not fully sensitive to the
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philosophical issues I have been discussing above. But he does describe his
approach in such a way that we can see its relevance as a model.
"Prices and other market instruments allocate the scarce resources
within a society and thereby constrain the desires of participants and
coordinate their actions. In the economic approach, these market
instruments perform most, if not all, of the functions assigned to 'structure'
in sociological theories."45
"The heart of my argument is that human behavior is not
compartmentalized, sometimes based on maximizing, sometimes not,
sometimes motivated by stable preferences, sometimes by volatile ones,
sometimes resulting in an optimal accumulation of information, sometimes
not. Rather, all human behavior can be viewed as involving participants
who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate
an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of
markets."46
He concludes that the economic approach provides the unified framework
"for understanding all human behavior" which eluded Bentham, Comte, Marx, and
others.47

Historically, microeconomic theory had difficulty coming to grips

with aggregate phenomena, and could not do so until it introduced "expectations"
as an explanatory factor. We may soon see many social scientists taking Becker's
lead and using the economic approach to explain such diverse social phenomena
as discrimination, crime, and family structure.
The approach clearly meets the requirements of the methodological individualists
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in that all social explanations can be reduced to concrete choices made by
individual actors.
There is one important way in which all social phenomena can ultimately be
reduced to individual phenomena without eliminating completely the causal role
of "social facts," although I have not found it mentioned in the literature. Each
man acts on the basis of his beliefs about the world. But each individual's world
view is comprised of imagined and culturally derived ideas and generalizations
from direct experience. Therefore, the hypostatized ideas and reifications about
society and social class and power that we each must develop as part of our world
views (a type of "social facts"), enter directly into the social process as we think
and make the most mundane choices. As individuals we cannot think
nominalistically. Our minds cannot deal directly with the multiplicity of concrete
and specific perceptions they have received. Rather, we can more easily use the
holistic ideas which we have formed in our minds as a result of those perceptions.
Yet our actions can still be analyzed in terms of the specific individual ideas and
choices that determined them and are therefore best described nominalistically
from the point of view of an external observer.
On this analysis, there is a causal role for intellectual aggregations in social
science explanation, though it is not the same one described by Durkheim or
Marx. Furthermore, the actual mental entities populating the world views of
different individuals are not likely to be identical. So even at this level,
methodological individualism seems to hold.
But there is little doubt that there are groups of people who share very
similar outlooks, especially with respect to narrow aspects of the world. It is
because of this that E. C. Banfield can write about class differences as differences
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of views about the world and the individual's relationship to and sense of control
over that world.48
It is also probably the case that Marxist class analysis reflects these
differences that Banfield points out to us. The Marxist analysis intellectualizes the
paranoid defeatist outlook of the lower classes and explains how it is that all those
people who never thought for a minute about the lower classes are really in a
conspiracy to exploit them, and why the structure of power permanently excludes
the oppressed classes from opportunities to work within the system to improve
their situation.
In fairness, it should be pointed out that Marx' theory was not consistently
holistic in the sense I have criticized above. Marx often argues for his theory in a
utilitarian fashion assuming that individuals rationally pursue their own individual
interests. When the class-oriented behavior Marx predicted does not materialize,
it does not indicate that the economic motivation is not predominant, as some of
his critics have implied, but rather that there are no individual incentives for class
action.49 To develop a consistent holistic theory Marx would have been logically
obliged to emphasize the sincere, selfless sublimation of individual interests in
favor of class-oriented behavior. But instead he emphasized selfish, individual,
bourgeois calculation in a Benthamite fashion, ignoring the sociological and
psychological processes by which an irrational or emotional class consciousness
might develop.50 Of course, Marx simply failed to grasp the fact that class interest
48
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and individual interest were not just two sides of the same coin.

This failure characterizes most holistic approaches to social explanation and
explains the persistent inability of Orwell and other socialists particularly to
perceive the many important implications of the fact that most if not all social
phenomena can be reduced to individual motivation and choices. The difficulty in
seeing these implications usually revolves around the problem of unintended
consequences. Radicals like Connolly have tried to force their way through this
by assuming class-wide phenomena of self-deception. But the analytically elegant
solution is Adam Smith's invisible hand. It is the one that takes all the facts at face
value and has no problem with the reality of individual intention in all action, even
when social results do not reflect those intentions.
One obvious illustration of this analytical problem is Orwell's account of
British imperialism in Burmese Days. Orwell implies that the effects of British
imperialism are evil because of the petty, selfish, racist attitudes and motives of
the individual participants. The ability of evil men to shape the world in
accordance with their intentions is exemplified by the completely corrupt native
official, U Po Kyam, who, like the British empire, is always successful in his evil
schemes. And he is the most deliberate of Orwell's characters--choosing and
scheming the very consequences he produces. Only death cheats him, coming
early, before he can build the pagodas that will ransom him from a Buddhist
hell--small loss, we might expect, in Orwell's eyes. But it is the only punishment
the author can muster. Like other writers of the same persuasion, Orwell fails to
take into account the very important unintended consequences of most human
activity as part of the measure by which social and economic systems should be
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judged. The real blessings of economic growth and development and higher
civilization are invisible to Orwell, hidden by his almost adolescent inability to
distinguish the morality of intentions and the value of social results.
So while Orwell distinguishes himself from the socialist intelligentsia of his
day by using almost exclusively individualist explanations for human behavior, he
fails to take the additional step taken by methodological individualists and
recognizes nothing resembling Adam Smith's invisible hand working
systematically beyond those intentions and producing social effects which must be
evaluated on their own merits.
Robert Nozick has helped us understand the distinctiveness and value of
invisible hand explanations. "They show how some overall pattern or design,
which one would have thought had to be produced by an individual's or group's
successful attempt to realize the pattern, instead was produced and maintained by
a process that in no way had the overall pattern or design 'in mind.'"51

Nozick notes that most examples of invisible hand explanations seem to be
of the equilibrium process variety in which "each component part responds or
adjusts to 'local' conditions, with each adjustment changing the local environment
of others close by, so that the sum of the ripples of the local adjustments
constitutes or realizes P."52 This would include market explanations for particular
patterns of distribution, prices, etc. And this kind of invisible hand explanation
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would be consistent with methodological individualism.53

Big Brother Forever?
These analyses come full circle to help us with our analysis of power. To
the extent that power is defined in terms of intentions and success in changing the
world, power is a short range phenomenon. For in the long run no one
successfully changes the world through coercion to fit his intentions. Almost
universally, unintended consequences drown out the intended ones. Human
individuality, creativity, and self-interest work day and night to frustrate the
tyrant's plan. Totalitarianism of Orwell's variety may be possible in the short run
with a charismatic dictator such as Hitler, Stalin, or Mao. But it cannot maintain
itself in an institutionalized form over time as Big Brother. China in the Cultural
Revolution in many ways exemplified 1984.54 But it could not maintain itself over
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time or generations. Russia has maintained itself somewhat longer, but the long
run looks very unsettled. The East European states are in various stages of
transition. Even without rule of law and constitutional protections, creative
self-interest whittles away constantly at the structures of socialist power.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that some men have deliberately made
contributions to the world that have had much of their intended effect over the
long run. But their intentions have not sprung from a lust for power; nor have they
been implemented coercively. Contrary to Orwell's example of U Po, these are the
authors of ideas and institutions which which continue to attract that voluntary
support of men seeking self-improvement. Their longevity stems from the value
of their continuing contributions to others. James Madison and John Adams stand
out as two great examples in the American tradition. Fortunately for the quality of
our lives, history provides countless other examples.
Orwell runs right up against this problem of social explanation in 1984 as
he attempts a thought experiment that will make this form of imagined
totalitarianism a future reality. In order to transcend the charismatic totalitarian
regimes of the first half of the twentieth century Orwell saw that two things
needed to be institutionalized. The first was the charismatic individual who could
keep control of the full apparatus of government and command the fate of
individuals and groups at his whim.55 Big Brother was a permanent non-dying
Stalin or Hitler image, maintained by the party. Orwell could only institutionalize
the dictator himself by institutionalizing his lust for power through the members of
55
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the Inner Party. Thus Orwell portrays O'Brien fulfilling his personal lust for
power by making Winston suffer, obey, and even love in return for the monstrous
way he is treated. At the same time O'Brien also contemplates his own mortality.
O'Brien resolves this difficulty quickly by asserting even in reference to himself
and his fellows that it would not matter if the hateful activities of the Inner Party
wore the members out by age thirty, for the death of the individual is not death.
"The Party is immortal."56 And the paradox of individuals motivated by group
gains, which can only be felt by individuals in principle, is assumed away.
Not only is Orwell trying to imagine the institutionalization of the
charismatic leader, but even more importantly, he asserts the possibility that the
power lust itself can be institutionalized. He actually presents O'Brien as one who
can be driven primarily by power lust and can simultaneously be satisfied with the
satisfaction of that lust for the Party rather than for himself. It is of no
consequence that he will age and die. The Party will live forever. And the Party's
lust for power will be increasingly satisfied in the future as more and more people
are made to suffer in the process of obeying its commands. But the Party's life and
lustings are only metaphors. And they cannot explain O'Brien's behavior. They
cannot explain why he is not driven to become Big Brother himself, to gain power
over the Inner Party for himself.
Orwell has Winston respond correctly that "there is something in the
universe--I don't know, some spirit, some principle--that you will never
overcome."57 But he doesn't understand that it is the principle of individual
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motivation within the Party that will preclude the total institutionalization of the
lust for power, and therefore preclude any state from arriving and remaining at the
horror levels of Oceania. With the demise of the charismatic dictator, the Party
may indeed carry on as in the Soviet Union, by banding together to maintain their
privileged position against the rest of society. But such a party cannot maintain
itself in the way Orwell imagines. Rather, it must engage in the fiction of doing
humanity a service and in the actual balancing of interests internally on a day by
day basis to maintain its power position. The nominalistic character of social
reality cannot be assumed away. Tyranny is a recurring fact of human experience.
But Oceania is not a permanent possibility, however much Orwell may have feared
that only technological gimmicks would be necessary to usher it in.
At this point the contradiction between the holistic and individualistic
elements of Orwell's writing clash head on. And it is the question of power that
brings on the clash. For if it really is not possible for this highly individualistic
lust for power to be satisfied vicariously through an abstraction or a whole such as
the Party, then it is not possible for a party to build stable power on that form of
motivation in its members. It would seem inevitable that by encouraging them to
seek power, they can only satisfy their lust by seeking their own power over each
other as individuals. And unlike Adam Smith's invisible hand, which promotes
the general good as individuals seek their own interest, the pursuit of naked power
without constitutional restraint can only produce chaos, disorder, and suffering.
For the pursuit of self-interest in a market leads each actor to find the ways in
which he can perform the services for others that will be most valued by them.
But the pursuit of power over a society is a truly zero sum game, and there is no
equilibrium position that maximizes each actor's utility. For in this game, as
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Hobbes correctly saw, the differences of human strength and intelligence are
insignificant. The weakest man can easily kill the strongest man. Orwell's
nightmare is therefore possible only if the power lust he emphasizes can indeed be
institutionalized. And given the impossiblity of that, we cannot join the author in
the belief that 1984 describes a society that could come into being, not even with
the technological advances which he imagines to facilitate mind control.
Orwell, of course, is not the first to try to imagine how a society might be
organized on principles of supra-individual forms of motivation. Plato saw that
the logical extension of the state under a philosopher king, if it were to be
possible, would be a community of pains and pleasures, in which every man would
share in the pains and pleasures of every other.58 Thus each would be motivated
individually to promote the greatest pleasure of all, rather than of self. It would
seem that Plato really saw the problem more clearly than any other, and certainly
more clearly than the socialist writers of the last century and a half. For whereas
they have been willing to allow themselves to solve this problem with a mystical
assertion that individuals would act on the basis of class interest rather than
self-interest, Plato realized that somehow the interest of the individual must be
made to coincide with the interests of the group. Plato's imagined communism is
then on the right level, the communism of all pains and pleasures. But as Plato
knew full well, the radical separation of our bodies (and, therefore, minds) makes
this community an absolute and permanent impossibility. The best polity for men
will have to be one that takes full account of their individuality and recognizes that
as long as they are men they can only act on the basis of choices arising out of
individual understanding and motivation. Like the modern philosophers, Plato
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saw individuality as the insuperable barrier to all utopian schemes. And like them,
he sees rule of law and constitutions as the best hope for human societies.
Contrary to what I had hoped to find, Orwell, like many others who have
written on these subjects, has not advanced our understanding of power or its
abuse. Rather, he has perpetrated the same confused views on the subject which
have helped derail the twentieth century in its discussion of tyranny. It is
unfortunately the case that the theory of constitutionalism stands today in
considerable disrepair. During the course of the twentieth century particularly it
has been abused, neglected and perverted to the point that both academicians and
laymen are likely to discuss contemporary constitutional questions in terms of
misconceptions that would have been easily identified by most educated men two
centuries ago.

